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The collaborative projects described in this e-book have already pro-
duced thrilling new danceworks, new technologies, and innovative 
experimental methods. As the papers collected here show, a further 
happy outcome is the emergence of intriguing and hybrid kinds of 
writing. Aesthetic theory, cognitive psychology, and dance criticism 
merge, as authors are appropriately driven more by the heteroge-
neous nature of their topics than by any fixed disciplinary affiliation. 
We can spy here the beginnings of a mixed phenomenology and eth-
nography of dance practice and choreographic cognition, which is 
deeply informed and empirically inspired by the best current theory 
in the sciences of the embodied mind.1 These sciences must them-
selves increasingly deal with culture and cognition all at once: ques-
tions about pleasure in movement, habit and skill, and kinaesthetic 
memory, for example, require neuroscientific, physiological, psycho-
logical, sociological, and anthropological investigation simultane-
ously. These then are essentially collaborative enterprises, and the 
active interpenetration of the concerns of dance practitioners and 
academic researchers is one remarkable success of Unspoken 
Knowledges and Conceiving Connections. 
Mapping the uniqueness of dance (and of its differing traditions 
and styles) requires cognitive scientific enquiry into similarities with 
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and differences from other temporal and performing arts, and other 
embodied activities such as sport; and this in turn requires close 
access to the kind of thick description available to participants and 
experts in each domain. If experimental intervention in this context 
involves the collaboration of dancers, choreographers, and dance 
audiences in the creation, development, performance, and analysis 
of new funded works such as Red Rain, Not Entirely Human, Fine Line 
Terrain, and Quiescence, enthusiasts are likely to embrace this empir-
icism most willingly. In reflecting on these discussions of ‘bodymind’ 
and of the choreographic process by Robin Grove and Sue Healey, my 
remarks focus first on some questions the papers raise about the 
interplay of cognitive and motor systems – of, roughly, knowing or 
thinking and doing or moving – in choreographic cognition. Then I’ll 
briefly sketch one natural extension to the dynamical orientation of 
this research in the shape of recent ideas about the ‘extended mind’ 
and ‘distributed cognition’.
Dance practitioners and experts are intensely attuned to the 
non-referential features of movement: as Shirley McKechnie writes, 
‘subtle dynamic shadings, tensions and releases, rhythmic patterns 
and counterpoints are the stuff of which dance phrases, motifs, 
themes and variations are constructed’.2 Of course, as Robin Grove’s 
discussion of Keats reminds us, the verbal arts too rely on all kinds of 
hints, pulses, and rhythms, and we don’t favour novelists just for 
telling good stories; but he rightly goes on to argue that the intrinsi-
cally embodied nature of dance-making renders especially salient 
forms of experience ‘that can hardly be translated into words’. 
Writers on both practice and theory in dance, then, emphasise 
the independence of the embodied, procedural systems involved in 
movement from more obviously representational systems such as 
autobiographical memory and semantic knowledge. Symptoms of 
this independence include the frequent inarticulability and the con-
scious inaccessibility of many processes underlying complex move-
ment (in its conception, its execution, and its appreciation). Of course 
some verbal descriptions offered by dance teachers and by critics can 
be more effective or satisfying than others; but this ability to tell is an 
entirely different skill from the more mysterious battery of coordi-
nated perceptual-motor-memory capacities which underlie dance 
production and performance.3 
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Such enactive skills and habits are also learned differently from 
explicit thought, for they need repetition, practice, and grooving; 
those on which we rely in ordinary life are thus often ‘traceless prac-
tices’, to the extent that we often don’t see them as forms of memory at 
all.4 But these danceworks are extraordinary, and far from traceless. 
The various records of their development document visually as well as 
verbally the development of these specifically regulated forms of 
improvisation, offering rich resources for the study of realistically 
complex procedural memory. They reveal, for example, in convincing 
detail how the deliberate, explicit disrupting in rehearsal of such 
‘habitual, flowing awareness’ can be difficult and occasionally frus-
trating.5 In dance as in sport and in ordinary routinized activities, 
thinking can cause trouble. The initial development of a skill may 
require hard, effortful, conscious control, but when a set of embodied 
movements is inhabited fully, wholly and easily remembered in the 
muscles, it can often be explicitly forgotten.6 This ‘expertise-induced 
amnesia’7, which often accompanies higher levels of spontaneous 
skilled performance or flow, is prized in much sports psychology: its 
absence or breakdown, when explicit memory and conscious control 
of movements return, is a sign of difficulty or failure. In the extreme, 
‘choking’ under pressure, or other forms of performance breakdown 
or ‘yips’, can be partly caused and then entrenched by excessive atten-
tion to, or reflection on, skills which had been successfully routinized.8 
It would be intriguing to investigate any comparable kinds of difficulty 
or blocks experienced by dancers, both within ordinary rehearsal 
processes, and in any longer-term disruptions in the individual body-
mind. 
But in dance, and especially in the highly collaborative projects 
described in this book, there is not such direct competition between 
conceptual and explicit knowledge, on the one hand, and the enduring, 
fluid wisdom of the ‘bodymind’ on the other.9 Sue Healey’s account of 
the pleasurably cumulative evolution of the Niche Series, and of how 
complex theoretical concerns about space informed the designs, move-
ment phrases, and performances of a sequence of performances, dem-
onstrates that explicit, conscious and procedural embodied forms of 
thinking and feeling can and often need to interpenetrate. Philosophical 
or political ideas, wishes, hints and half-remembered dreams, idiosyn-
cratic individual memories, cognitively-loaded emotional states and 
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moods, perceptually-driven assessments of complex cultural situa-
tions, and other cognitive processes which are (to varying degrees) 
more articulable and accessible than is movement itself, can all influ-
ence the creation, performance, and enjoyment of dance. The extent 
and nature of these intricate interactions depend on the kind of art-
work and the context of performance.10 The impenetrability of the 
motor system is far from complete: unless thinking could work with 
moving, and doing with knowing, the richness and flexibility with 
which kinaesthetic memory is honed and accessed for particular pur-
poses in dance would be sharply limited. These investigations offer a 
unique opportunity to track the literal incorporation over time of idea-
patterns as they are embodied into movement-patterns and gradually 
inhabited and then actively lived out to the full in performance. 
The documented uses of notebooks and video in the evolution 
of these danceworks demonstrate that this process of transmitting, 
playing with, and selecting elements across an ensemble of dancers 
did not occur solely within each individual choreographer’s mind. 
Particular movements and sequences could loop out into the world, 
jump across bodies, get tried out briefly and discarded or remoulded, 
and then be accessed again and again later through the enduring 
technological record. This is just the most obvious of a number of 
respects in which the creative processes in question are literally dis-
tributed, or extended across many brains, bodies, and artefacts. 
Researchers on these projects have already convincingly applied 
recent dynamical hypotheses in cognitive science to the case of cho-
reographic cognition, and Shirley McKechnie has pointed to the rele-
vance of dynamical systems concepts to understanding creative 
processes in small groups of dance practitioners.11 One concrete way 
in which these thoughts might develop in future is by making contact 
with compatible ideas about the extended mind and distributed cog-
nition. As Andy Clark puts it, ‘our brains make the world smart so that 
we can be dumb in peace’.12 This includes our collective and indi-
vidual utilization and mastery of external symbol systems and 
artefacts like videos, notebooks, and notations. But cognition is inter-
personally as well as technologically distributed: we work together 
with each other in many ways to form temporarily integrated larger 
systems with cognitive characteristics and abilities which are often 
quite different from the mere sum of individual capacities. 
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In the choreographic process, existing movement repertoires 
are often reconstructed in the spread of embodied ideas and move-
ment patterns across individuals. Rebuilding the old familiar ways 
under particular new circumstances or demands, the shared memory 
evolved by particular ensembles need not be held in any single person 
or in any single or canonical notation. Choreographers and dancers 
alike continually lean on, manipulate, recirculate, and transform 
materials held in and spread across a range of media, including idio-
syncratic but repeatable movements, shared kinaesthetic memories, 
verbal or other labels and compressed or shorthand cues, and external 
recordings of various kinds. Each such form of scaffolding has its own 
distinct properties. So choreographic cognition, as the contributors 
to this book realize, is an intricate natural artistic domain in which to 
study the peculiar interfaces that emerge in intelligent action which 
is extended in space as well as time across the diverse components 
within such groups of practitioners and their cognitive technologies. 
I fervently hope that the collaborations reported here in practice and 
research can be continued and further developed.
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